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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
Hll'HAHD .T. YOUNG,
Plai11tiff a11d .Appellant,

I

vs

.
Case No .
·
.J l'LIA l\l. HAHNE Y and L:TAH
10519
FARl\I llUREAU INSURANCE \:
CO~IP ANY, a corporation,
\
Defendants and Respo11dcnts. I

Appellant's Petition for Rehearing
and Brief in Support Thereof

COMES NO"r the plaintiff and appellant herein
and respectfully petitions this Honorable Court for a
rehearing in the above-entitled case. It is appellant's
position that this Court's decision affirming dismissal
of Utah Farm Bureau Insurance Company from the
case is contrary to la\Y and should be reversed and this
petition is based 011 the following:
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POINT I
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THIS
COURT FAILS TO CORRECTLY INTER- ,
PRET THE LANGUAGE AND MEANING OF
RULES 18 AND 20, U.R.C.P. AND IS A DENIAL TO PLAINTIFF OF DUE PROCESS OF 1
LAW.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THE DECISION RENDERED BY THIS
COURT FAILS TO CORRECTLY INTER- 1
PRET THE LANGUAGE AND MEANING O:F '
RULES 18 AND 20, U.R.C.P. AND IS A DENIAL TO PLAINTIFF OF DUE PROCESS OF
LAW.
The underlying theory upon which the present
decision rests appears to be that juries cannot be trusted
to be impartial toward insurance companies and that
the courts therefore should not permit suit against an
insurer even in a case where it has expressly bound
itself by _contract to pay damages suffered by an injured party.
This brings up some very vital questions: \Vhat
authority do the courts have for selecting the cases or
class of cases which juries should be considered dis-
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1

,

,

qual died to impartially try? If one court believes
that jurors are prejudiced against insurance companies,
another court may belieYe that jurors are prejudiced
against railroad companies or manufacturing companies or great industrial organizations or persons of
great wealth or persons of a different race or color or
religion. Shall the court then deny the right of jury
trial as against such defendants~ If such a person or
rnrporation or associatiou has contracted to pay a
debt owing by another party, will the court say the
beneficiary will not be permitted to sue on such contract? Or ·will it say that the plain 'vording of Rules
18 and 20 must be interpreted as containing an implied exception to protect such individuals or organizations against being joined in a suit with the original
debtor? Or if an insurance company or great corporation or rich individual or person of color has become surety on a note or contract of another party,
will the courts be justified in reading into Rule 18
or Rule 20 an exception to prevent suit against the
surety until after judgment against the principal
obligor? If so, where is authority given in the law to
confer such a discretion or power upon the courts '1
ls the right to jury trial a right which is subject to
discretion of the court? If Rules 18 and 20 'vere adopted with a view to anJidance of multiplicity of trials
and bringing all interested partie-, before the court
in one action, should it he thought that the rule makers
had i~1 mind an undisclosed intention to protect insur~mce companies, or any other class of persons or
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companies, from being subject to the plain wording
of these rules?
If appellant's counsel in their former brief failed
to bring out clearly to the court that the case now before
the court is unmistakeably different from the cases
cited by the court in its opinion, we then beg leave
to make the point clear that in this case it is expressly
alleged in the amended complaint that the defendant
insurance company has bound itself by its contract,

not merely to indernnify the insured against damages,
but has bound itself to pay all damages suffered by
any person through use of the automobile covered by
the policy. That made a contract for the benefit of a
third party. It is the kind of liability insurance which
is imperatively needed in this day of high speed traffic
and constant1y increasing accidents and tragedies on
the highways. It is the kind of liability insurance which
is contemplated hy financial responsibility laws. These
laws were not adopted to protect or indemnify drivers
against judgments. They were adopted to provide
protection to persons injured by an operator of a
motor vehicle. Therefore, when an insurer binds itself
by its contract to pay damages suffered by the injured
person, what law or logic can forbid the injured person
the right to sue the insurer directly? Or to join the
insurer with the tort-feasor in a suit to recover dam·
ages? Can it be said that such a suit is merely a suit
to determine negligence or liability of the tort-feasor
and that the existence of insurance and the insolvency
of the tort-feasor are entirely immaterial? Does the
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eoml reali,,,<· that the trial eourt so ruled, and that this
eourt is upholding this ruling in the preseut opinion 1
Ilas the eomt forgotten what was at least intimated in
the case of .Ellis v. Gilbert, Hl U.2d 189; 429 P.2d 39,
that the object and purpose of a suit such as this is
not merely to determine the question of negligence
but to reeovcr <lamages ( And, if the tort-feasor is
iusolvent, can any good reason be given for refusing
to allow the injured person to join a party who has
houucl itself by contract to pay such damages?
This brings us back to the point made in our
former brief that the only possible ground 'vhich can
be urged under present rules to prevent joinder of an
insurer with the tort-feasor in an action for damages
i~ that the policy of insurance contains a "no action
dause." There is no discussion of this point in the
eourt's opinion. And no discussion of appellant's contention that the defeudant insurance company is estoppe<l to claim the benefit of such a clause by reason of
a contrary clause which binds the insurer to defend
au~' actiou brought against the insured. And no discussion of the further point that the company has
elected to take over defense of the action-and was not
made a defendant until after it had so elected and
had taken control of the defense of the action.
Furthermore there is no discussion of fundamental
constitutional questions to which the attention of the
court was irrdtecl in appellant's former brief. Nothing
is said as to the con::;titutional right of equal access
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to the courts and that the courts shall be open for
redress of grievances. It is not asserted either by the
court or by the opposing counsel that the refusal of
the defendant insurance company to pay damages,
which by its contract it had agreed to pay, does not
constitute a "grievance" within the intent of the constitutional provision. Nothing is said as to the constitutional or statutory right to jury trial, or the right
asserted by plaintiff to enforce a contract made for his
benefit by due process of law. Nothing is said as to the
constitutional provision that the right to recover damages for wrongful death shall never be abrogated.
The opinion appears to stand upon the sole ground that
the courts have decided that juries cannot be trusted
to be impartial toward insurance companies-and that
such decisions are binding upon the court regardless
of facts which are pleaded in this case-and admitted
by the pleadings of the defendants - which unquestionably distinguish this case from the class of cases
ref erred to in the opinion and in the respondent's brief.
It is not shown in the record before the court
whether or not the insurance policy herein involved
contains a "no action clause." But in order to forestall
a second appeal, counsel for appellant in their former
brief, expressly requested the court to assume, for the
purpose of' this appeal, that the policy contains such
a clause.

Respondent's counsel, in their brief, passed over
this point \Vith the very casual comment that the no
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action clause is not a part of the record and that "even
if it were, the general rule is contrary to the position
urged by appellant." Respondent then cited 15 A.L.R.
7G3 as follows:
"The validity of a clause in a casualty insurance policy that no action shall be instituted
against an insurer until the liability of the insured shall have been determined by a final judgment or by agreement of the parties has generally been upheld."
It will be noted that nothing is there said as to
the effect of the no action clause in a case where the
insurer has also reserved the right to defend and where,
as here, it has taken charge of and is conducting the
defense. It should further be noted that this point is
nut involved in nor referred to in any of the cases cited
lJIJ respondents. Counsel for appellant has found no
case in which a court has held that the no action clause
forbids impleading the insurer as a defendant where
it has reserved the right to defend and has exercised
such right. It is submitted that no such case can be found
and that the court should not uphold such inconsistent
and arbitrary contract arrangements.
It has repeatedly been held by the courts in interpreting Rule 14 of the Federal Rules that the "no
action clause" in liability insurance policies cannot be
used to prevent an insured when sued in a negligence
action from impleading the insurer in such action.
Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice and Procedure
IA ( 1960) Sec. 426.3, discusses the matter as follows:
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"~lay a def eudant in a negligeuee action imp lead his liability insurer under Rule 14. This
q uestiou which has been much discussed is i11
fact uot <lifi'ieult. lloth on principle and ou
authority it is clear that the answer must be in
tlre affi~mative."

"The argument has been adrnuced that although implea<ler of an insurer may be proper
in the abstract, still it is not permissible where
the policy of insurance contains a "no-action
clause" ... It is apparent that such clauses are
inconsistent with Huie 14. The cases are agreed
that lhe rule rather than the policy provision is
controlling. The leading case is .Jordan v. Stephens.
In that case it is said:
The no-action clause is directly opposed to
Rule U. It poses a question as to whether the
courts should permit litigants to circumvent rules
of court by contractual arrangements. Rule H
\Vas promulgated not for the purpose of serving
litigants but as a \vise exposition of public policy.
The object of the rule was to facilitate litigation,
to save costs, to bring all the litigants into one
proceeding, and to dispose of an entire matter
without the expense of many suits and many
trials. The uo.-nction clause of the policy is
neither helpful to the third party defendant. to
the courts, nor generally, is it in the interest of
. the public welfare. Its object is to put weights
on the already slow feet of justice . .J ordau Y.
Stephens, 7 FHD HO, (D.C. l\Io. Hl.J.5).

"THIS Appears to represent what is now
the settled Yiew."
8

Appellant submits that the right of equal access
to the courts is a sacred and inherent and fundamental
right. The right is violated when a person, who is a
real party defendant in interest, is permitted to come
into court and conduct defense of an action behind a
shield of secrecy. Any contract provision in a liability
insurance policy which purports to give a person such
a right is not only against public policy but is an attempt to deprive the injured party of a fundamental
constitutional right.

''It is a general principle that persons who
are not parties to a suit have no standing in
court to enable them to take part in or control
the proceedings." Ann. Cas. 1913 D. 1031.
"Persons who are not parties of record to a
suit have no standing therein to take part or
control the proceedings." 39 Am. J. 928 Sec.
55 n. 17.
"A stranger to an action can take no part
therein except to intervene or to make an application to become a party thereto." 67 CJS 977
Sec. 53 ( e) n. 27. 47 C.J. 96 n. 23.
Greenwood v. Burt, 202 N.,V. 489, 162 Minn.
247

Hunt et al v. Hoerr, 80 N.,V. 1120, 78 Minn.
281

Pac. Dig. Key No. 38 "Parties"
''Any agreement which tends to vrnrk a fraud
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or an imposition on a court of justice is void as
against public policy."
17 C.J .S. 1087 Sec. 232 n. 39
13 C.J. 447 n. 17
125 p .2d 987' 989
"All agreements, it is said, relating to proceedings in court, civil or criminal, which involve
anything inconsistent with the impartial course
of justice, are void, although not open to the
charge of actual corruption, and regardless of
the good faith of the parties.·'
17 C.J .S. 594 n. 47
"The principle has been applied to a stipulation in a contract that a party who breaks it may
not be sued. Or that a party may not resort to
the courts."
17 C.J.S. 1057 n. 59
13 C.J. 456 n. 5
"Contract provisions intended to oust courts
of their jurisdiction in advance are void."
17 C.J.S. 1069 Sec. 229 (1)
"If the court has jurisdiction of an action, the
parties cannot deprive the court thereof by contract, and agreements made in advance of controversy where the object is to oust jurisdiction
of the courts are contrary to public policy and
will not be enfarced."
lb. n. 58
Referring now to the observation made by the court
that Rule 20 is "permissive"-·with the implication that
the right of joinder granted by the rule is not a "right"
but a favor or privilege ,vhich is subject to discretion
of the court, appellaut submits that this does violence
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to the language of the rule and is contrary to fundamental principles of statutory construction. A statute
or rule which is unconditional language grants permission to do an act ought never to be interpreted as
being subject to the will or discretion of the court.
Referring now to the comment by the court that
''it is generally held that it is not proper to join an
action such as the primary one here, which is based
on negligence, and therefore in tort, with one like the
claimed supplemental action which would be in contract" appellant submits that Rules 18 and 20 were
adopted for the express purpose of eliminating the
evils and useless burdens of that former rule. Barron
& Holtzoff has this to say upon the matter:
"Under this Rule practically all restrictions
on joinder of causes of action are abrogated.
The Rule expressly permits either party to join
in the same action as many independent or alternate legal or equitable claims as such party
may have against the other. Thus, where the
parties are the same, there is no restriction whatever. The former limitations on the joinder of
causes of action in contract and tort, or causes
of action at law or in equity exist no longer. If
the parties are different any joinder is permitted in respect to claims which arise out of the
same transaction or occurrence or series of
transactions or occurrences, and involve a common question of law or fact." 2 Barron & Holtoff 40.
In this connection it seems appropriate to refer
to the comment as to object and purpose of the new
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rules wh[cl1 was made by this court iu the case of Ellis
Y. Gilbert, J.29 P.:!d 39, 40:
"Tlieir purpose is to make procedure as simple
and efficient as possible by eliminating any useless ritual, undue rigidities or teclmicalites which
may have become engrafted in our law; and to
remove elements of surprise or trickery so the
parties and the court can determine the facts ,
and resolve the issues as directly, fairly and expeditiously as possible. In accord with this is
l:he beginning policy statement in Rule 1 (a):
'that the rules shall be liberally construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive, determination of every action.' "
Appellant submits that the foregoing comment of
the court in Ellis v. Gilbert should also be considered
in connection with the discussion of Rule 18 (b) in
the opinion in this case. The court here expresses the
opinion that the makers of the Rule 18 (b) appear to
have had in mind situations where one party has a
claim against another, and where ultimate recovery
might depend upon resort to property, which, by a
fraudulent conveyance, or perhaps in situations of some
generally similar character, was in the hands of a third
party, in which case the sequel action could be joined.
That view seems to be unjustifiably influenced by the
reference to fraudulent conveyances in the title of the
rule. It is definitely not consistent with the footnote
appended to the rule which recites that:
"The rule applies particularly to suits against
a surety
before determini1w
.
'-" the extent of the
liability of the principal."
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Appellant contends that the title is no part of the
act and that the broad and explicit language of the
rule clearly embraces a situation such as shown in this
case. Also that to restrict its application to cases involving fraudulent conveyances, or similar situations,
would be a clear violation of the general object and
purpose of the rules as hereinabove set forth.
We submit that the time has come to break the rule
of masquerade wherein an insurance company which
is the real party defendant in interest is permitted to
conduct the defense and yet mislead the jury to believe
that an impoverished or penniless individual is the only
party chargeable with payment of the judgment.
The time has come for courts to declare that juries
should know the facts and not be deceived by a cloak
of concealment thrown around the real party defendant.

If insurance companies cannot trust jurors to deal
with them without prejudice, why should a plaintiff
not fear that a jury will be affected by undue sympathy
for the defendant where appearances indicate that
an impoverished individual must bear the burden of
the judgment?
'\Then no mention of insurance is permitted is it
not probable that jurors will assume that there is no
insurance and that they should trim the verdict out of
sympathy for an unfortunate individual--or to make
it more probable that the judgment will be paid?
Is it not also verily true that insurance carriers
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win many mistrials and new trials and many appeals
by reason of belief of judges that mention of insurance
in the hearing of jurors must be considered prejudicial
error-even in cases where the real defendant in interest
is an insurance company which is conducting and controlling defense of the case and using its vast resources
of legal talent and investigative machinery to defeat
the claim of an injured party?
Is it not time to unshackle the hands of trial judges
and permit frank and sensible questioning of veniremen
as to their interest in or connection with or prejudice
toward insurance companies, and permit sensible and
frank instructions by the court as to duty of jurors
where insurance is involved?
Respectfuly submitted,

WILL L. HOYT and
RA,VLINGS, 'VALLACE, ROBERTS
& BLACK
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